Eugenics Offended by Wilson, Robert A.
Monash Bioethics Review, in press 
Eugenics Offended 
 




This commentary continues an exchange on eugenics in Monash Bioethics Review between Anomaly 
(2018), Wilson (2019), and Veit, Anomaly, Agar, Singer, Fleischman, and Minerva (2021).  The 
eponymous question, “Can ‘Eugenics’ be Defended?”, is multiply ambiguous and does not receive 
a clear answer from Veit et al..  Despite their stated desire to move beyond mere semantics to 
matters of substance, Veit et al. concentrate on several uses of the term “eugenics” that pull in 
opposite directions.  I argue, first, that Veit et al. (2021) makes much the same error as does 
Anomaly (2018) in characterizing eugenics; second, that the paper misunderstands the relationship 
between eugenics and enhancement; and third, that it distorts the views expressed in my “Eugenics 
Undefended”.   
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The eponymous question, “Can ‘Eugenics’ be Defended?”, is multiply ambiguous and does not 
receive a clear answer from Veit, Anomaly, Agar, Singer, Fleischman, and Minerva (2021).  Despite 
its stated desire to move beyond mere semantics to matters of substance, Veit et al. (2021) 
concentrates on several uses of the term “eugenics” that pull in opposite directions.  Readers may 
leave the paper more confused about what eugenics itself is than when they set out.   
Veit et al. both (a) treat “eugenics” as a hot-button term used to shut down debate, and 
(b) entertain the idea that “eugenics” is little more than a euphemism for genetic enhancement.  
(a) implies that  
(1) the term “eugenics” clouds thinking about important philosophical issues raised by 
reproductive technologies, policies, and practices (and so is a term we should avoid 
using).   
(b) suggests that  
(2) eugenics is simply a form of human enhancement (and so is unobjectionable as such). 
Although Veit et al. state that they “are not primarily concerned with the respective arguments” 
(p.61) of the papers their commentary follows, they also indicate that  
(3) the critique of Anomaly’s “Defending Eugenics” (Anomaly 2018) in my “Eugenics 
Undefended” (Wilson 2019) makes an unreasonable demand of proponents of genetic 
enhancement and aims to curtail rational discussion.   
I take up (1) – (3) in each of the following sections so numbered.  I argue, first, that in 
suggesting (1) Veit et al. (2021) makes much the same error as does Anomaly (2018) in 
characterizing eugenics; second, that (2) expresses a misunderstanding of the relationship between 
eugenics and enhancement; and third, that the discussion supporting (3) distorts my stated views.   
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Eugenics consists of a set of ideas, practices, policies, and laws aimed at intergenerational 
human improvement.  Not any-old-which-way, but by favourably changing the balance of 
desirable over undesirable physical or psychological traits that individuals have in a population.  
Reproduction and heritable traits typically have been a focus for eugenic intervention because of 
their role in intergenerational improvement.  Genetic and enhancement technologies are often 
discussed in terms of eugenics because of their roles in affecting reproduction and the presence of 
desirable and undesirable traits in a population.  Various past eugenic ideas, practices, policies, and 
laws constituted part of a world-wide social movement that is often thought to have ended in 1945 
or shortly thereafter.  This characterisation does not itself delimit the boundaries of eugenics,1 but 
does set parameters for those boundaries. 
 
1. Obscured by Clouds  
I concur with Veit et al. that the term “eugenics” can be used in ways that cloud thinking about 
important issues.  One might gloss my “Eugenics Undefended” as claiming that Anomaly’s 
“Defending Eugenics” exemplifies this epistemic vice.   
One aspect of Veit et al. (2021) that I subsequently find bizarre is that it very much points 
the finger at others here.  One of its authors (Agar) has recently published a short essay in a popular 
medium admitting that his past advocacy of liberal eugenics is an instance of “philosophical shit-
stirring” (Agar 2021).2  Another of its authors (Anomaly) wrote “Defending Eugenics”, a title 
acknowledged in its very first sentence as being “deliberatively provocative” and that Anomaly 
himself has characterised as having a click-bait title.  Yet Anomaly doesn’t actually defend eugenics 
as a set of ideas, practices, and policies that once drove a global, historical social movement.  Nor 
do Veit et al. suggest that this can be defended.  Both purport to defend something they call eugenics. 
As noted, one primary concern in Veit et al. (2021) is with uses of the term “eugenics” that 
aim to shut down discussion, especially by drawing attention to a history in which the Nazis feature 
prominently.  I agree that using “eugenics” to truncate or silence discussion can be problematic, 
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just as the use of “genocide” or “euthanasia” can be.  Yet the genealogy of such concepts at the 
interface of politics and science matters, particularly in the case of eugenics, since it names both a 
set of ideas and a historical social movement with substantial, consequential uptake.   
More serious problems arise with appeals to eugenics when they (i) aim to be deliberatively 
provocative, and (ii) mischaracterise what eugenics is.  In “Eugenics Undefended” I argued that 
(ii) was true of Anomaly (2018), where only the meliorative kernel of eugenics is included in 
Anomaly’s working definition of eugenics (“any attempt to harness the power of reproduction to 
produce people with traits that allow them to thrive”, Anomaly 2018, p.24).  The same is true of 
Veit et al. (2021), which points primarily to this same aspect of eugenics.  This allows Veit et al. to 
make the claim, first, that a wide range of bioethicists are eugenicists, and second, that “it is hard 
not to implicitly endorse some kind of eugenics” (Veit et al., p.62, emphasis in original).   
If eugenics were simply a form of human improvement, betterment, enhancement, or 
melioration, both points might hold.  But unfortunately, it is not.  Eugenics rests on the distinction 
between better and worse traits, aiming to shift the balance between their occurrence over 
intergenerational time.  It is concerned fundamentally with what sorts of people there should be 
in future generations and how we might intervene in the lives of present people to influence this 
for the better.  Historically, eugenics has often focused on reducing or eliminating the “worse 
traits” in future populations, doing so through negative eugenic measures, such as sterilisation or 
killing.  To make or acknowledge this point is not to “play the Nazi card”.  Operating with a 
truncated characterisation of eugenics and then drawing a conclusion about the implicit, 
widespread endorsement of “some kind of eugenics” manifests (i) and (ii).   
 
2.  Only Words   
Veit et al. (2021) appear to hold that the support of many contemporary bioethicists for eugenics 
should be viewed as unproblematic, since “eugenics” for such bioethicists simply refers to genetic 
enhancement.  In attempting to buttress their views of eugenics, Veit et al. (2021, p.61) appeal to 
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MacKellar and Bechtel’s 2014 book The Ethics of the New Eugenics, referring to the 2016 printing.  
They say that MacKellar and Bechtel there “define eugenics as involving ‘strategies or decisions 
aimed at affecting, in a manner which is considered to be positive, the genetic heritage of a child, 
a community, or humanity in general’ (MacKellar and Bechtel 2016, p.3)” (Veit et al. 2021, p.61).  
When MacKellar and Bechtel characterize eugenics in terms of such strategies and decisions, 
however, they identify it amongst a series of “informed suggestions” (p.3), rather than widely 
accepted definitions (p.3).  Moreover, the broader context of that characterization problematizes 
the equation of eugenics and genetic enhancement and Veit et al.’s more general attempt to 
destigmatize contemporary eugenic enthusiasm within bioethics.    
The introduction to MacKellar and Bechtel’s book begins as follows: “Selection strategies 
or decisions aimed at affecting, in manners which are considered positive, the genetic heritage of 
a child, a community, or humanity in general have always represented a challenge to human beings 
from an ethical perspective” (p.1).  They then say that the term “eugenics” is often used to describe 
those strategies or decisions. MacKellar and Bechtel then immediately note that “a clear definition 
of the term [eugenics] has remained elusive” (p.1), say that “it is particularly important to clarify 
what is meant by the expression” (p.1), and recount the Greek origins of the term.  They then state 
that “eugenics includes selection on the basis of genetic characteristics and stems from the belief 
that human beings or humanity can be improved by encouraging people with desirable traits to 
have children and by encouraging people with undesirable traits not to procreate” (MacKellar and Bechtel 
2016, p.1, my emphasis).  So from the outset MacKellar and Bechtel are explicit that the means 
through which eugenic goals can be accomplished include forms of negative eugenics, forms 
omitted by a characterisation of eugenics given only in terms of the positive genetic enhancement 
of individuals or populations.   
MacKellar and Bechtel continue by noting the “successful selection and elimination of 
inherited characteristics in plants and animals implied the possibility that similar practices could occur 
with human beings” (MacKellar and Bechtel 2016, p.1, emphasis added).  Here again they draw 
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explicit attention to the place within eugenics not just of “successful selection” but of the 
elimination of undesirable traits from individuals and populations, intimating forms of eugenics 
involving stronger forms of “discouragement”, such as sterilization.  Their “informed suggestions” 
list of terms includes, beside “eugenics” itself, “Destructive eugenics”, “Negative (or preventive) 
eugenics”, and “Nonvoluntary eugenics” (MacKellar and Bechtel 2016, pp.3-4). Together with 
their contrasting characterisation of enhancement (p.5), and their more general advocacy of 
retention of the term eugenics together with its historical associations, this sets their views apart 
from advocates of (2) and the views of Veit et al. (2021). 
Veit et al. go on to state what they call an “important conclusion”, namely that “everyone 
who considers pre-natal testing justifiable, or who thinks women should be free to weigh genetic 
information in the selection of a spouse or a sperm donor is a eugenicist” (Veit et al., p.62, 
emphasis omitted).  These claims are simply false.  One might consider prenatal testing and the 
freedom to weigh genetic information in spousal or sperm donor selection justifiable for a number 
of reasons, many of which are not eugenic.  For example, one might do so on grounds of one’s 
own health or for longer-term family planning (in the former case) or because one aims to preserve 
a stigmatised trait or population-level diversity (in the latter).  Such reasons need not be eugenic, 
even if they sometimes are.  
So while Veit et al. (2021, p.62) are correct that “genetic enhancement” is sometimes used 
as a euphemism for “eugenics” by bioethicists seeking to circumvent controversy, the two 
phenomena are distinct and should not be equated.  Eugenics need not involve—indeed, 
historically has not always involved—enhancement, genetic or otherwise.  Genetic enhancement 
provides one cluster of strategies to achieve either individual or intergenerational human 
improvement.  But other eugenic strategies, such as immigration restriction laws, anti-
miscegenation laws, and child removal practices, are well-known to historians and sociologists of 
eugenics.  Perhaps being unduly focused on select uses of “eugenics” within bioethics, Veit et al. 
(2021) miss what is obvious to those working across the history and philosophy of science, social 
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studies of science, technology, and medicine, and race, gender, and disability studies.  Eugenics is 
not simply genetic enhancement (see also Reinders, Stainton, and Parmenter 2019 and 
commentaries). 
 
3.  Nothing if not Critical   
Veit et al. (2021) also contains three distortions of my “Eugenics Undefended” (Wilson 2019) 
First, they begin by saying that I “criticized almost every premise in Anomaly’s paper” 
(Veit et al. p.61); however, the very first of “seven basic flaws” that I purported to identify in 
Anomaly (2018) was its “failure to argue for eugenics”.  What I had in mind was not that one or 
more of the premises in an argument were false, but that the paper contained no argument for eugenics 
at all.  I considered this especially problematic in a paper entitled “Defending Eugenics” written 
by a philosopher.  The various claims the paper makes about eugenics were not assembled in the 
form of premises that, suitably linked, constituted an argument.  Moreover, they could not readily 
be rationally reconstructed to do so—or at least I confessed my own shortfall here in “Eugenics 
Undefended”.  I did not criticize “almost every premise in Anomaly’s paper”.  My view was (and 
is) that the paper, lacking an argument for eugenics, contains no premises at all.   
Second, Veit et al. (2021, p.63) purport to find the following objectionable demand in 
“Eugenics Undefended”: 
Wilson (2019) demands that proponents of genetic enhancement such as Peter Singer 
(2001, 2003), Jonathan Glover (2006), Nicholas Agar (1998, 2004, 2019), Julian Savulescu 
(2001, 2009), John Harris (1992, 2007), Walter Veit (2018a, b, c), and Jonathan Anomaly 
(2018, 2020) should pay attention to ‘the actual history of eugenics and the considerable 
scholarship on it’, which should ultimately raise the standards of credibility that ‘any 
publishable work defending eugenics should meet’ (p. 68). 
Basic canons of interpretation have been ignored or abandoned here.  “Eugenics Undefended” 
doesn’t use the term “enhancement”, let alone “genetic enhancement”, and doesn’t mention Harris 
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or Veit at all.  Here is the relevant passage, which occurs just before I list the seven putative 
shortcomings of Anomaly (2018): 
The author [Anomaly] is certainly correct to suggest that there are aspects to eugenics that 
remain attractive to many and are perhaps even philosophically defensible.  That is why 
some leading figures in ethics and bioethics—Peter Singer, Jonathan Glover, Nick Agar, 
and Julian Savulescu for example—have provided defenses of versions of, or aspects of, 
eugenics, or ideas central to eugenics, as I have discussed elsewhere (Wilson and St. Pierre 
2016; see also Barker and Wilson 2019).  “Defending Eugenics” seems to advertise itself 
as engaged in the same sort of enterprise but does little to contribute to meaningful, 
ongoing debate over eugenics.  Given the actual history of eugenics and the considerable 
scholarship on it, there are reasonable expectations that any publishable work defending 
eugenics should meet.  In my view, both the penultimate and published version of 
“Defending Eugenics” fails to meet them (Wilson 2019: 68). 
Here I draw a contrast between the discussion in “Defending Eugenics” and defences of aspects 
of eugenics that I consider to be “perhaps even philosophically defensible”—defences that I 
identify via the names of the first four authors that Veit et al. (2021) lists in the passage above.  Far 
from tarring seven authors as inattentive to the history of eugenics and the scholarship on it, I am 
distinguishing between four who have made philosophically worthwhile contributions to 
discussions of eugenics and another who has fallen short here in a single publication.3   
 The view expressed in “Eugenics Undefended” is not that any worthwhile work discussing 
eugenics needs to rehearse or reflect on the history of eugenics.  Rather, it is that given the history 
of eugenics and the substantial scholarship on that history, there is a reasonable expectation that 
any defence of eugenics will do at least seven things: argue for eugenics, accurately characterize 
eugenics, accurately summarise any scientific consensus invoked, avoid misleading simplifications 
of history, avoid misplaced virtue signalling, show historical sensitivity in reaching for moral 
principles, and ensure that the links from eugenics to policy recommendations are substantial or 
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robust.  The argument was that Anomaly (2018) fails to meet every one of these reasonable 
expectations.  
 Finally, Veit et al. (2021) intimate that “Eugenics Undefended” is part of a restrictive, 
unhelpful movement that aims to shut down discussion of brave new ideas.  They write that it is 
“important that the debate about eugenics continue [sic] unconstrained by requirements such as 
those that Wilson (2019) would impose.  The silencing of reasonable defenses of eugenics 
threatens a dangerous neglect of the risk of repeating past errors …” (pp.62-63).  As my reply here 
underscores, “Eugenics Undefended” is squarely and somewhat narrowly focused on Anomaly 
(2018).  It readily concedes that “there are aspects to eugenics that remain attractive to many and 
are perhaps even philosophically defensible” (Wilson 2019, p.68).   
In The Eugenic Mind Project (2018a) I have explored a position I call standpoint eugenics and 
argued for both its epistemic potential and epistemic limits.  In “Well-Being, Disability, and 
Choosing Children” (2019), written jointly with Matthew J. Barker, I have challenged a popular 
argument from the principle of procreative beneficence to the claim that we should create children 
who are disability-free, including through the use of genetic technologies.  In this and in other 
work (e.g., Wilson 2015, 2018b, 2020, 2021, in press; Wilson and St. Pierre 2016) I show concern 
for the perspectives of people living with disability.  But it is both false and its own form of 
uncharitable dismissiveness to suggest that I view my “scholarship as a sort of activism for the 
rights and concerns of the disabled” (Veit et al., p.65).4  Having any of the authors contributing to 








†   I would like to thank Jorge Mendonca, Lucia Neco, Hans Pols, and Gemma Smart for some 
ongoing discussion of the issues raised by the series of papers that this paper contributes to, as 
well as two anonymous reviewers for the journal. 
1   Here I do not mean to be inviting a resolution of questions about whether (say) the rational 
persuasion of people to adopt vegetarian beliefs in order to improve humankind is a form of 
eugenics, or what the preceding characterisation needs for such resolution.  Thanks to a 
reviewer for prompting the clarification. 
2  Agar relies on the OED definition of a shit-stir as an “attempt to provoke or aggravate, esp. 
without serious intent” and is very much aware that his “confession” itself may reasonably be 
viewed as an instance of shit-stirring.  Readers no doubt will draw their own conclusions about 
the phenomenon and its relationship to both academic and public philosophy. 
3 To be clear that it is the paper not the person that is my target here, Anomaly (2020) clearly 
belongs in the former category; it does so while largely avoiding the term “eugenics”. 
4  Scholarship informed or motivated by activism can be fruitful; I resist the suggestion that 
activism has a truth-spoiling presence either in the present discussion of eugenics or more 
generally.  For more on activism, disability, and philosophy, see Wilson (2020). 
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